The Korean war stalemate during 1952 and 1953 provided many chances where an intercepting fist would have been effective. Allied forces turned back many Chinese offensives with heavy firepower and blocking movements leading to a stalemate. If the Allies had used a Sun Tzu tactic and lured the Chinese into a false sense of accomplishment by withdrawing in the face of an attack, much of the Chinese Army could have been trapped and strangled. Likewise, as 12 of 13 North Vietnamese divisions advanced on Saigon in 1975, the US military contemplated an intercepting fist. A proposal that a Marine Corps division land just north of the DMZ and press westward to cut off supplies was considered. This was rejected for political reasons but may have stalled the North Vietnamese offensive way down south. An intercepting fist is the ideal strategy for America's concept of rapid deployment forces. Early arriving forces are light and lack supplies needed for prolonged defensive engagements. Tossing them in front of enemy armored spearheads is foolish. Even elite American airborne forces considered themselves mere "speed bumps" if Iraqi armored divisions had pushed south from Kuwait in 1990. A counteroffensive is a better strategy in such cases since the further enemy forces rapidly advance, the more vulnerable they become. Of course politics comes into play as enemy objectives may be deemed essential to defend. In such cases, light units equipped and trained for rearguard actions are best. Nevertheless, offensive oriented Generals must learn that an intercepting fist is often the best strategy. Military strategy is not limited to combat, economic strategy is important. Much of World War II strategy involved securing oil supplies. Chapter 2 discusses the value of strategic materials but stockpiles only buy time. Nations must think long-term and consider subsidizing certain industries for national security reasons. For example, the day may soon arrive where all American steel mills close because it is cheaper to import steel from Asia. However, if war disrupts those imports the USA will be unable to manufacture many military items and will have trouble starting up a steel industry since no domestic expertise will exist. This is not to say that all American steel mills must be protected, but some capacity must be retained along with the expertise needed for wartime expansion. The operations of massive multi-national corporations pose problems as well. Ownership and control of these powerful ubiquitous organizations is difficult to follow. The Germans have quietly taken over the Chrysler corporation, although they are open about it. The Chinese bought IBM's personal computer division, and then tried to buy Unocal but failed. The extent of foreign ownership is difficult to measure as shares are owned by third parties like mutual funds, banks, and hedge funds. Since shareholders own corporations, nothing prevents a foreign nation from buying shares and thus voting rights and control over the board of directors of defense contractors. They needn't place foreigners on the board, just anyone willing to support their interests. Board members may pressure the CEO to export military technology or move a factory overseas. For example, most American soldiers are shocked to learn that China is building numerous types of American designed military HMMWVs (left) with a license and parts support from General Motors. The export of military technology is an important strategic issue. The United States spends billions of dollars to develop advanced equipment but often gives that technology away so a contractor can make a few more dollars. For example, the computerized ship defense radar technology called Aegis was sought by the Japanese. The US Navy spent billions of dollars to develop this system, but Japan didn't want to buy it outright even though they have a huge trade surplus with the USA. Instead, they were allowed to manufacture it under license, which means they paid a small sum for the technology to build it themselves. The South Koreans demanded a similar deal to build F-16 fighters and India wants to get its hands on F/A-18E/F blueprints. Chinese fighters now carry copies of Israel's Python 3 air-to-air missile, which downed 50 Syrian aircraft in 1982. Israel is thought to have sold numerous types of weapons to China, including Patriot missile technology, which was possible after a Patriot missile was stolen from an American battery defending Israel during the 1991 Persian Gulf war. This is a difficult area but military strategists must be aware that hidden business deals can alter the balance of power among nations. Friends and alliances can change quickly as demonstrated by this photo of US Marines posing with an American built UH-1 Huey helicopter captured in Iraq. Nevertheless, the United States supplies the dictatorship of Egypt with over one billion dollars a year in military aid, which includes advanced equipment like M1A1 tanks, AH-64D "Longbow" Apache helicopters, and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Egypt has no threat that justifies these weapons and the strategic rationale for providing these advanced weapons to an unstable nation whose citizens are mostly hostile to the United States is questionable. Other Arab dictatorships are sold very advanced weapons. For example, the UAE has purchased F-16Es, which are more advanced than the F-16Cs used by the US Air Force. One excuse is that business is business and that if the USA does not sell advanced weapons they will buy it elsewhere. However, the few advanced nations that produce these weapons are allies. It will benefit world peace if makers of advanced weaponry, which include the USA, France, Germany, Britain, Sweden, Israel, Russia, Japan, and now South Korea formed a weapons cartel to restrict sales to less developed regions like Africa, Central and South America. Similar restrictions have limited improvements to China's arsenal, although Russia has become a major supplier as a result. International corporations are not evil; they are often a positive influence. In 2004, Pakistan and India began trading insults and threats as they have done every few years since their 1948 war. However, India is industrializing and its economy is growing rapidly due to foreign investment. Tough talk worried major corporations so they put plans on hold and many chose to locate operations in other nations. The leaders of India quickly determined that an old dispute about a remote area was not worth the loss of foreign investment so the harsh rhetoric ended. 8 worldwide in industrial production, just ahead of France. Economic warfare is more common that most realize. The world disapproved of South Africa's apartheid policies and implemented an economic embargo that lasted for years and eventually succeeded in encouraging needed change. The US and Britain defeated Libya by organizing an economic embargo. Eventually, Libya "surrendered" and stopped supporting terror groups and Islamic revolutions in Africa. In 2014, the US and Britain overthrew its government anyway. Embargos are often difficult to enforce as arms dealers are skilled at shipping items through third party nations. Worldwide trade is so massive that no one has time to inspect more than a sampling of shipping containers that flow through ports. This has become a problem for the US military as foreign agents attend Defense Department surplus auctions and pay tiny sums to acquire varied surplus parts because some contain advanced technology. These are complex issues and entire books are written about these subjects. How should a nation train military strategists? The first challenge is teaching students that some of what they learned in school is false. Nations and institutions develop a culture based upon myths of superiority. For example, World War II combat infantryman Paul Fussell's book "Doing Battle" didn't sell nearly as well as books by Stephen Ambrose, who somehow missed military service but became wealthy writing about brave and brilliant American troops in World War II. Fussell wrote that of the 12 million Americans who served during World War II, only one million volunteered. The rest entered "kicking and screaming" with the threat of imprisonment and spent the war scheming to avoid combat. His short book "The Boys' Crusade", is about infantrymen fighting in Europe during World War II where he served as a lieutenant. Most fighting was done by American infantrymen, who were just out of high school. They were drafted and didn't want to be in the war or the Army. The Army's official tally was 19,000 deserters in Europe. Self-inflicted wounds (a downward bullet wound to a leg or arm) were so common that the Army kept a tally and used it to measure unit morale. When the U.S. Army's new 106th Infantry Division was attacked at the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge, it didn't put up a fight. Its boys were so startled by the unexpected appearance of large numbers of German panzers that officers jumped into jeeps and fled while 8000 GIs threw up their hands and surrendered. The "platoon guide" was a junior sergeant added to each infantry platoon whose duty was the trail the platoon and confront anyone who attempted to desert. During the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans sent 150 English speaking commandos dressed in US Army uniforms to infiltrate American frontlines and cause chaos. They were quickly captured because American MPs guarded all roadways. Any healthy soldier heading toward the rear was presumed a deserter and arrested and interrogated. It is difficult to learn from history because by definition it is "his story"; the victor's account of what happened. Students of history cannot learn from mistakes if they are hidden. Blunders are often spun into magnificent accomplishments. For example, during World War II the US Pacific Fleet Command thought the Japanese island of Iwo Jima was lightly defended and that it would take just three days to secure it with the loss of around 600 Americans killed. This tiny, remote island with no harbor or fresh water source was not important since it posed no threat to American ships or aircraft. As a result, the Iwo Jima landing began with a light naval gunfire bombardment, then Marines went ashore to mop up. They were surprised to find 21,000 Japanese dug into fortified mountains. An intense battle raged for 36 days that resulted in 6800 marines, soldiers, and sailors dead. Twice that many were wounded so badly they were sent home and discharged. This unnecessary battle wiped out almost half the combat power of the entire US Marine Corps. Why was intelligence so bad? Was more reconnaissance possible? Should the Marines have withdrawn when the mistake was discovered? Such issues are never addressed because this bloody battle was spun into a dramatic victory. Even worse, there is a shallow mindset among many people not to question government historical accounts because it is viewed as unpatriotic. This controversy is summarized in an excellent yet unpopular book, "The Ghosts of Iwo Jima." A US Marine Corps major once stated that having an extensive and effective public relations branch was good, but its own officers confuse positive sales crap with reality. Another element that dampens military thought is the power of military contractors. In the United States they are free to hire retiring Generals to promote products, who earn their pay by influencing former subordinates and friends still in uniform. This caused military doctrine and tactics to appear just to support the sales pitch for certain types of technology. Soldiers in the US Army dismiss the value of "robotics," but complex and expensive systems are pursued anyway. Everyone is told that unmanned aerial vehicles must be purchased, although their utility is often dubious. The US Marine Corps embraced an unworkable doctrine called "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" (OMFTS) despite its obvious flaws. This warping of military strategy discussions into sales pitches for new expensive equipment was criticized a few years ago by Marine Corps General Paul Van Riper: "There's an unfortunate culture developing in the American military that maybe should make you nervous. I don't see the rich intellectual discussions that we had after Vietnam. I see mostly slogans, clichés and unreadable materials." Van Riper was referring to the Pentagon's blueprints for the future, which are dull and void of details. The current arrays of doctrinal publications crafted at the Department of Defense are mostly garbage. While the authors of these materials carry impressive credentials, it is obvious they lack the intellect, courage, or knowledge to write useful publications. Most are products of institutional inbreeding where people are promoted for supporting the status quo or whatever idea has caught their rater's fancy. They have a nice job that requires little real work, so why upset everyone trying to change things? In addition, military officers know there are profitable post-retirement jobs for those who don't rock the boat. The US military once had interesting and respected independent professional journals supported by subscriptions from their officers. However, defense contractors knew that articles in these publications carried weight, especially if that officer was near or past the end of his career and unafraid of retribution. They began to advertise heavily in these journals to gain influence. These small publications now had much more money, which allowed nicer offices and higher salaries. As a result, their editors became hesitant to bite the hand that feeds them by printing articles critical of weaponry or unworkable new tactics invented to justify them. No one questioned why corporations were spending money to advertise something like an attack submarine. Did they expect a reader may want to buy one? A big factor in getting published is not quality but politically correct content. All professional journals prefer articles that reinforce the established viewpoint of that organization. Although editors consider themselves independent and like to read controversial ideas, they mostly adhere to the company line. They may accept a controversial article for future publication, but never publish it. Despite inter-service rivalry, don't expect one service publication to print an article critical of another service. US military bureaucracies operate under a truce in which public criticism is discouraged. On the other hand, organizations like to view themselves as innovative, so articles that propose radical change are allowed, so long as they are vague and unrealistic. An article detailing the advantages of delaying the F-35 program will never get published, although it may be "accepted" then shelved in deference to the advertising clout of contractors. However, an article advocating "major change" and discussing "synergy" and "new paradigms" is attractive to editors. Lofty articles about transformation and free thinking are lauded, so long as they do not propose real change that threatens careers or corporate profits. As a result, American military officers are shocked to read anything challenging the status quo or articles critical of a major weapons system in development. They assume that several successful military operations in recent years has proven their superior training, doctrine, and equipment. Yet the military balance in all these conflicts has been overwhelmingly in the favor of the United States military. Bragging about successes in these lopsided fights would be like a professional sports team bragging about their success in crushing local high school teams comprised of teenagers. This is not to say the US military is inept, it has many excellent units. However, Germany had excellent units in World War II yet lost the war after strategic blunders caused by overconfidence. Unfortunately, rigid thinking is most common among senior military officers. They advanced in rank by following orders and supporting the status quo in an environment where independent thinking and candid discussion is strongly discouraged. This is why senior military colleges produce such lousy Generals. When General George Marshall took over the US Army prior to World War II, he decided the Army's prestigious Command and Staff College was making his officers less capable, so he closed it. It is difficult for military institutions to teach independent thought, especially to officers who have been exposed to no other corporate culture. The ideas which propelled the German army intellectually in the 1930s were the result of several books, not teachings from their war colleges. Even then, radical changes like panzer divisions and dive bombing aircraft were opposed by most German Generals and implemented only because Adolf Hitler saw their merit. American military colleges have digressed from military education to satisfying the egos and post-military career aspirations of officers. Over the past few decades, they became accredited like civilian universities so degrees could be awarded to their graduates. This required hiring expensive PhDs, many with no military background or interest in warfare. Adopting academic testing and grading (e.g. If military officers need a civilian degree, it is far cheaper to send them to the best "accredited" universities in the nation, which allows them to mix with people outside their military culture. If a military college wants to teach strategy to future General officers and Admirals, students should not spend a year in classrooms learning institutional myths and memorizing test material, they should be stimulated to form their own ideas. This is best accomplished by observing military operations while reading professional books, watching professional videos, and discussing the issues raised. There should be no tests so students can educate (and offend) anyone with frank comments. For example, a group of 20 American colonels can arrive and spend just a few hours at a "war college" to check-in and board their tour bus. They start out with a month of briefings in the Pentagon and bondage other nearby agencies. Then off to Norfolk where they spend two weeks on a Navy aircraft carrier preparing for deployment, and a month at Camp Lejeune to serve as umpires for a major joint operation. Next they spend two weeks at the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, then a month at Fort Polk to observe an infantry training rotation at that center. They are allowed one-month to spend at home with professional reading assignments along with another month of personal leave for vacation. They then meet at Nellis AFB in Nevada for a month to observe a "Red Flag" exercise, then a month at Fort Irwin to view an armored warfare training rotation, followed by a month at 29 Palms to watch a Marine Corps combined arms exercise. Then a month to visit a Defense Logistics Agency activity. Finally, they participate as umpires in another field exercise, then perhaps a trip overseas to visit a world hot spot at the cutting edge. During these travels, most Colonel-students would read more military books than during their previous twenty years. However, the selection of professional reading material becomes problematic. In the US military, each armed service has developed a list of professional books to read. These are selected by senior Generals who are keen to avoid controversy and want to portray their service in the best light. These include excellent books that are non-controversial, and reading common books is essential for classroom discussion. Therefore, it is best for half the books that students must read come from institutional recommendations, but students should be free to select the other half of military books they wish to read from wherever they can find them. Rather than group discussion used for the required institutional books, students will present an oral book report for each of their chosen books to their classmates and answer questions. Another method of teaching strategy is through games. There are hundreds of sophisticated and realistic war games that can be played on home computers. Many military training centers have complex exercise simulators available. Students should be exposed to war games so they understand that strategy depends on what your opponent wants to do as much as what you want to do. Since it takes some time to learn war games, chess should be the primary form of instruction. Read Teach Chess for more information. Chess may not be the best war game, but most students already know how to play and it doesn't require a computer. Students on tour will be involved in a continual chess tournament, eventually playing everyone in their class a few times. Videos are a great instructional tool. Several outstanding series have appeared on television, usually on the History Channel, including one called "Strategy," which reviews famous battles in detail, complete with moving map displays, historical pictures, and film footage. The brilliant documentary "The Fog of War" is a must see. There are many excellent military films that provide an ideal format for discussion of difficult leadership issues. Once again, the problem of which films arises, so half are selected by the war college while each student is free to select any military film for his class to view together. Videos may be watched aboard their bus, or perhaps in the evening while on the road at a room in the officer's club so everyone can enjoy a few drinks during the film, followed by frank discussions. Students at these mobile colleges would have no instructors, just a class advisor who travels with them and a briefer at each location who works for the war college, so as not to burden and annoy the commands they visit. This may seem expensive, but it will cost much less than maintaining all the infrastructure and staff for a war college. The class would travel on a bus like a tour group, while they read, play chess, watch videotapes between tours to observe military operations, and learn from those who actually perform military tasks. A mobile military college planning to graduate 1000 students a year needs no instructors nor classrooms, just a single briefing room for arrivals, 50 tour buses with drivers, 50 tour guide officers (class advisors), and a dozen liaison-briefers at varied locations where they visit. This method will stimulate strategic thinking, instead of manufacturing unthinking machines at an expensive war college factory. 1. Eliminate advertising at professional journals. With computers and the Internet, it only takes two or three full-time employees to produce an excellent monthly journal. If money is short, don't publish a print edition, put it on the Internet. As a result, editors would not care if an angry executive from Boeing calls. 2. Eliminate "accredited" military colleges and the awarding of advanced civilian degrees. 3. Replace senior military college classroom instruction with tour buses filled with books, videos, and chess sets. Warfighting and original thinking is best learned by reading, playing (chess), watching (videos), observing operations, and talking with people on the frontline. General George S. Patton Jr.